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“As most fuel subsidies accrue to higher income households, it should be possible 
to eliminate or substantially reduce subsidies, use some of the budgetary savings 
to finance better targeted-programs to compensate the poorest households, and 
still have funds left over.” – Baig, Mati, Coady, and Ntamatungiro (2007), p. 14 
 
 
I. Introduction        
 Many developing countries subsidize uneconomic activities. Besides distorting the 
allocation of resources, subsidies squander scarce public funds, aggravating the problem of 
revenue mobilization. Governments of developing countries could pick low-hanging revenue 
fruit by eliminating uneconomic subsidies. 
 Subsidies for the consumption of fossil fuel are especially wasteful. In addition to the 
negative impacts on resource allocation and public finances mentioned above, they fritter away 
foreign exchange, complicate demand management, aggravate energy insecurity, and encourage 
traffic congestion and air pollution. In addition to these undesirable effects, which, with the 
exception of some forms of air pollution, affect primarily the country subsidizing fuel 
consumption, these subsidies encourage the emission of CO2, the most plentiful greenhouse gas 
(GHG) thought to be responsible for climate change. Because climate change is a global 
problem, Annex 1 signatories of the Kyoto Protocol, (essentially advanced countries and some 
countries in transition from socialism) pledged: 
  
Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, 
tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that 
run counter to the objective of the Convention and application of market 
instruments;
2
 
 
In September 2009, leaders of the Group of Twenty (G-20) largest industrialized and developing 
economies, in a bid to advance their energy security and climate change agendas, made a non-
binding commitment “to rationalize and phase out over the medium term inefficient fossil-fuel 
subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption.”3. In November 2009, leaders of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation, which includes some developing countries, as well as advanced 
countries and countries in transition, made a similar commitment.
4
 Recognizing the costs 
described above, many developing countries have made unilateral commitments to reduce 
subsidies.
5
  
 This paper examines subsidies for the consumption of fossil fuels provided by developing 
countries and oil-exporting countries. (In what follows all unqualified references to fuel 
                                                 
2
Kyoto Protocol, (Article 2(a)(v). 
3 
G-20 Leaders (2009) 
4 
APEC Leaders (2009). 
5 
Issues of World Energy Outlook for various years describe some of these commitments, progress in fulfilling them, 
and political impediments to doing so. 
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subsidies are to subsidies for the consumption of fossil fuels, including electricity that is 
generated by combusting fossil fuel. Thus neither production subsidies nor subsidies for other 
types of energy, such as hydro, solar, wind, and nuclear, are considered.
6
 In this context, 
“consumption” does not mean only household consumption; it includes consumption by business 
and governments.) 
 The next section describes the negative effects of fuel subsidies mentioned above in 
greater detail. Although emphasis in this paper, as in most of the literature and in policy 
discussions, is on eliminating fuel subsidies, it should be emphasized that reforming fuel 
subsidies does not necessarily mean eliminating them quickly. There may be cases in which 
temporary, limited, and well-targeted fuel subsidies are appropriate. No effort has been made to 
identify these cases, which would require case-by-case analysis of the situation in particular 
countries.    
 Progress has been made in recent years in reducing or eliminating subsidies to the 
consumption of fossil fuels, but much remains to be done.
7
 Section III discusses briefly how fuel 
subsidies are defined, describes the price-gap methodology commonly used in cross-country 
comparisons of consumption subsidies, indicates some shortcomings in that methodology, and 
notes that the level of subsidies is quite sensitive to international fuel prices, moving in concert 
with them. Section IV presents estimates of fossil fuel consumption subsidies for the 37 
countries on which the International Energy Agency has complete data. The section then briefly 
describes some of the implications of eliminating subsidies, focusing on potential budget impacts 
in countries that, as a fraction of GDP, run significant budget deficits and spend significant 
amounts on fuel subsidies. 
 Fuel consumption subsidies are often defended as alleviating poverty, and some subsidies 
may further this objective. But, because fuel subsidies are often poorly targeted, the 
distributional impact of many subsidies is regressive, or at best proportionate to income. 
Regressivity is especially likely in most of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and some of 
those in Asia, where only a small minority of the population – fewer than 10 percent in many 
countries – uses modern fuels and may not even have access to them. It is often the middle class 
who benefit the most from fuel subsidies – and who defend them most adamantly.8 Section V 
discusses the distributional impact of eliminating subsidies, which varies from country to 
country, as well as by the type of fuel subsidized. 
 Although fuel subsidies are costly and are not well-targeted to relieve poverty, 
eliminating subsidies may impose onerous burdens on the poor. It may thus be necessary, for 
                                                 
6 
On subsidies to non-renewable energy, see IEA (2011a), pp. 527-40 and IEA (2012a), pp. 233-36. Fuel subsidies 
are commonly characterized as being related to production or to consumption. Production subsidies are important in 
both advanced and developing countries. Most fuel consumption subsidies occur in non-OECD countries. IEA 
(2011a), p. 509. 
7“Subsidies are thought to have fallen sharply in the early to mid-1990s, with the transition to market economies in 
the former communist bloc countries, but may have risen in recent years as many non-OECD countries have sought 
to prevent higher international energy prices from feeding into final prices for social reasons.” UNEP (2008), p. 10. 
In addition to fostering energy-inefficient manufacturing, the Soviet system failed to price  properly the electricity 
and heat delivered to commercial and residential customers. Petri, Taube, and Tsyinski (2003). See also World 
Energy Outlook for various years. 
8
If, as Dr. Samuel Johnson famously proclaimed in 1775, "Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel," perhaps 
protecting the poor is the scoundrel’s next-to-last refuge. 
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humanitarian as well as political reasons, to accompany subsidy reform with measures to 
alleviate the burden on the poor. Section VI examines measures that can be used to protect the 
poor when fuel consumption subsidies are reformed. Lack of space and expertise precludes 
discussion of the important issues involved in implementing fuel subsidy reform, including 
means of increasing support for reform by addressing distributional concerns.
9
 
 The use of biomass (firewood, charcoal, straw, agricultural residue, or dung) or coal for 
cooking and heating has several serious disadvantages: inter alia, emissions of GHGs are greater 
than with fossil fuels other than coal, dangerous indoor air pollution leads to impaired health, 
especially for women and small children, use of biomass often requires devotion of many hours 
to gathering fuel, again commonly by women and children, and, where dung is used for fuel, it 
causes deterioration of soil fertility. In recent years substantial attention has been devoted to 
assuring access to clean energy for all.
10
 An alternative argument for subsidizing the use of fossil 
fuels, albeit one that probably does not explain the prevalence of subsidies, is thus to induce poor 
households to shift from biomass and coal (solid or “traditional fuels”) to modern (non-solid) 
fuels (kerosene, gas, and electricity). Section VII discusses the use of fuel subsidies to encourage 
consumers to switch from traditional fuels to modern fuels. 
 A short concluding section draws some tentative conclusions, based on the analysis 
presented earlier. There is clearly a strong case for reforming subsidies to the consumption of 
fossil fuels, as reform would improve environmental, economic, and budgetary, performance in 
countries now providing fuel subsidies. Care must be taken, however, to avoid or offset adverse 
effects on the real income of the poor. 
 A caveat is in order at this point. The author is not expert in the topics examined here. 
Moreover, the appropriateness of these conclusions for any given country should be subject to 
further much more detailed examination, as it is unlikely that “one size fits all.” Rather, as the 
UNEP has warned, “The right policy approach for each country must take account of local 
market conditions, the structure of the energy sector, patterns of energy use, institutional 
characteristics, and changing circumstances.”11 See also the third caveat at the end of Section III. 
 
II. Disadvantages of Subsidies for Fossil Fuel Consumption
12
 
 In the absence of external costs and benefits, prices paid by consumers reflect social 
benefits, and marginal costs of imports and local production represent social costs, as does the 
                                                 
9
See, however, Gupta et al. (2000), UNEP (2004), pp. 147-54, UNEP (2008), pp. 20-29, Victor (2009), Laan (2010), 
IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank (2010), pp. 33-37, IEA, OECD, and World Bank (2010), pp. 27-36, IEA 
(2011), pp. 522-27, and APEC (2012), pp. 54-68.  
10The IEA (2011), p. 471, notes that the UN has declared 2012 to be the “International Year of Sustainable Energy 
for All.” IEA (2012a), chapter 18 is devoted to “Measuring Progress towards Energy for All.”  
11
UNEP (2008), p. 7. 
12
Among the many places these disadvantages are discussed are Gupta, Clements, Fletcher, and Inchauste (2003), 
UNEP (2004), pp. 147-54, OECD (2009), pp. 101-109, IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank (2010), and APEC 
(2012), all of which provide extensive bibliographies. IEA, OECD, and World Bank (2010), pp. 27-36, provides an 
excellent synthesis. Reducing the problems associated with fuel subsidies is sometimes said to be essential to 
achievement of the millennium development goals and the three pillars of sustainable development: economy, social 
welfare, and environment. See, for example, UNEP (2008), p. 5, IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank (2010), and 
UN-Energy (2005), p. 6-7. 
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price that can be obtained for exports. (In the case of exports the cost is an opportunity cost – 
what could be derived from exportation.) If, in addition, there are no non-competitive influences, 
prices reflect social coasts. 
 
A. The Economic and Environmental Costs of Fuel Subsidies 
 If these assumptions hold, consumption subsidies drive a wedge between the costs of 
products and their prices, and thus between the social cost and benefits of subsidized products. 
At the margin, subsidized consumption is worth less than it costs. (This is perhaps most easily 
seen when scarce foreign exchange is being used to import subsidized petroleum products or 
when excessive amounts of subsidized petroleum products are being consumed domestically, 
rather than being exported to earn foreign exchange. In either case foreign exchange could be 
used to buy imported goods and services that are valued more highly than the subsidized 
petroleum products.) The result of excessive consumption of subsidized fuel is a sacrifice of 
potential welfare, often called deadweight loss. Even though the extreme assumptions underlying 
this model of welfare maximization do not accurately describe reality, it is  generally thought 
that, with some important exceptions, free market prices approximate values fairly closely. This 
is the reasoning that underlies both the case for subsidy reform and the price-gap methodology 
described in the next section. 
 In the case of subsidies for fossil fuel consumption, the assumption that there are no 
external costs is not valid. The combustion of fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases, gaseous air pollutants (notably nitrous oxides and sulphur dioxide), and 
particulates that cause respiratory disease. This means that the optimal price for fossil fuels 
would lie above what it costs to produce or import them what could be gained from exporting 
them.
13
 Subsiding the consumption of fossil fuels thus creates a two-fold distortion of resource 
allocation: by encouraging both overconsumption (even if there were no environmental impact) 
and environmental damage. Subsidies for other kinds of consumption, although uneconomic, 
generally lack the second form of distortion. 
 It is common for fuel that is subsidized to be in short supply; after all, because of the 
subsidy, it costs less to buy the fuel than it is does to produce or import it.
14
 Aggravating 
shortages, kerosene can be substituted for unsubsidized diesel fuel for use in motor vehicles and 
stationary engines,
15
 and subsidized fuel may be smuggled to other countries, where it can be 
sold for more than its subsidized price. When shortages occur, it is likely to be the poorest 
members of society who must do without fuel, because of “petty corruption and favouritism,“ 
even if fuel is rationed.
16
 Moreover, implementing fuel rationing and preventing diversion of fuel 
                                                 
13
It can be argued that, from the perspective of any one country, the price of fuel should reflect only social costs 
occurring in that country –  that it should not reflect the world-wide damage caused by the release of greenhouse 
gases. In other words, the price that is optimal for a single country may not be optimal from a worldwide point of 
view. Measurement of price-gaps generally does not take account of external costs. If it does, it generally does not 
distinguish between external costs that are experienced within the country and those that are experienced outside. 
14
UNEP, (2008), p. 15, notes that state-owned suppliers of LPG in India were forced to ration supply to limit their 
losses. 
15
Baig, Mati, Coady, and Ntamatungiro (2007), pp. 16, note 7, cite a World Bank study that estimates that half of the 
subsidized kerosene sold in India is used to power vehicles.  
16
UNEP (2008), p. 14. 
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to unsubsidized uses and smuggling is a complex activity that absorbs administrative resources 
that are commonly scarce in developing countries and could be put to better uses. 
 Fuel subsidies do not merely result in overconsumption, deadweight loss, environmental 
damage, and shortages, which can be characterized as static effects. They can also have negative 
dynamic effects. By suppressing opportunities for profit and restraining cash flow of state oil 
companies, subsidies can deter investment in the energy sector. The poor, ostensibly the target 
population for subsidies, are likely to bear the brunt of the resulting energy shortages, as 
occurred in India.
17
 
  Fuel subsidies also discourage investment in energy-efficient technologies by businesses 
(including those engaged in agriculture), households (for example, in the choice of automobiles, 
building design, and appliances), and governments and, by cheapening the cost of transportation, 
encourage energy-inefficient urban development. Since many of these investments have long 
lives, countries that subsidize fossil fuel can be locked in to energy-inefficient investments for 
long periods. The result is excessive emissions of GHGs and pollution, as well as unnecessary 
economic costs. 
 The deadweight loss and external costs associated with fuel subsidies may actually be 
fairly small in the short run, when fuel consumption is relatively unresponsive to changes in 
price (that is, fuel demand is price-inelastic). In that case the primary cost is budgetary 
(discussed below). But costs increase over time, as demand becomes more responsive to price. 
Moreover, both smuggling to markets where fuel prices are higher and substitution of subsidized 
fuel for unsubsidized  fuel are likely to be quite price-elastic. 
 A shortage of foreign exchange is a chronic problem for many developing countries. 
Subsidizing the consumption of fossil fuels aggravates such shortages, regardless of whether the 
country is net importer or a net exporter of fuel, by either encouraging imports of fuel or 
discouraging fuel exports, other than cross-border smuggling. Even if fuel exporting countries do 
not feel the pinch immediately, they may do so in the long run, as excess consumption hastens 
depletion of fuel reserves and thus the decline of exports and eventual reliance on imports.. 
 One often overlooked implication of the inefficient use of energy  is fuel insecurity. It 
requires more fuel – and thus more foreign exchange, in the case of fuel importers – to power an 
energy-inefficient economy. Even countries that export fuel, or could, if domestic prices 
reflected opportunity costs, may experience energy insecurity because of their addiction to 
consumption of subsidized fuel. When energy is unavailable, or is available only at a prohibitive 
cost, economic activity grinds to a crawl, homes and workplaces grow cold and dark, 
transportation, for both business and pleasure, is curtailed, and national security suffers. This 
effect is more pronounced, the more energy-inefficient is a country’s consumption and 
production. Given that fuel subsidies encourage profligate use of energy, energy security would 
be enhanced by their elimination.
18
 
 
                                                 
17
See UNEP (2008), p, 29, regarding financial impediments to rural electrification. 
18
In principle, global energy security is undermined by the presence of fuel subsidies in any country. The 
oligopolistic production ceilings set by OPEC offset (some, all, or more than all of) the global effects of fuel 
subsidies.  
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B. The Budgetary Cost of Fuel Subsidies 
 Many developing countries have difficulty mobilizing adequate public revenues. As a 
result, they under-provide public services or rely on taxes that distort resource allocation or on 
excessive borrowing or inflationary money creation. As documented in Section IV, fuel subsidies 
constitute a significant drain on government revenues in some developing countries, countries in 
transition, and oil-producing countries.
19
 These budgetary costs increase when international fuel 
prices rise, unless domestic fuel prices are adjusted to reflect those increases. Smuggling and the 
use of subsidized fuel for unintended purposes aggravates the budgetary cost of subsidies. 
 Fuel subsidies may be either explicit, requiring budgetary expenditures, or implicit. Baig, 
Mati, Coady, and Ntamatungiro (2007), p. 10, observe, “Explicit subsidies mainly reflect 
compensation to the national energy company for the increased difference between the wholesale 
domestic price and the world price of fuels.” By comparison (p. 9), “The initial cost of implicit 
subsidies is typically assumed by the national oil company without explicit compensation 
through the budget.”20 Only explicit subsidies are likely to reflected as current expenditures in 
governments budgets. Implicit subsidies may eventually be reflected in revenues not realized, for 
example, as taxes or dividends not received from state-owned oil companies.
21
 In some cases 
subsidies may not entail a fiscal cost, as when export bans increase supply to the domestic 
market and drive down end-use prices of fuels. 
 Eliminating fuel subsidies may offer an attractive source of revenue. Besides avoiding 
distortions in fuel prices, eliminating fuel shortages, preventing illicit use and smuggling of 
subsidized fuel, alleviating foreign exchange problems, enhancing energy security, and curtailing 
pollution and the emission of greenhouse gases, such a policy would allow, in some 
combination, the expansion of public services, the reduction of taxes that distort the allocation of 
other goods and services (including those of labor and capital), and the avoidance of excessive 
and perhaps  unsustainable borrowing and inflationary money creation. The magnitude of this 
“multiple dividend”22 will depend on how much of the revenues saved by not subsidizing fuel 
consumption must be diverted to protect the real income of the poor, the topic of Section VI.
23 
                                                 
19
For example, Indonesia and Yemen spend more on oil subsidies than on health and education combined. UNEP 
(2008), p. 13. 
20 
Baig, Mati, Coady, and Ntamatungiro (2007), p. 10, present figures for explicit and implicit fuel subsidies, as a 
percentage of GDP, for 2003 (actual), 2005 (estimated), and 2006 (projected) , for 16 countries. 
21
Espinasa (2003) points out that the effect on the government take (tax receipts and dividends) will be lower, the 
lower is the income tax rate and the lower the share of after-tax profits of state oil companies paid in dividends.  
22
Using a Pigouvian tax to cause prices to reflect the social cost of environmental damage related to pollution and 
using revenues from the tax to reduce distortionary taxes entails a double dividend. The first dividend is the 
reduction in environmental damage caused by the tax and the second is the improvement in resource allocation 
resulting from the use of revenues from the tax to replace those from distortionary taxes. See Goulder (1995). As 
noted in the text, eliminating fuel subsidies involves several other dividends, in addition to dividends analogous to 
these two. In either case the second dividend may be the expansion of valuable public services or the avoidance of 
debt or money creation, rather than the reduction of distortionary taxes. 
23
Referring to subsidies that “harm the environment, bring few social benefits and carry large economic costs,” 
UNEP (2008), p. 22, notes that  “subsidy removal, in this case, would be a triple-win policy reform.” Similarly, IEA, 
OECD, and World Bank (2010), p. 3, says, “Phasing-out fossil-fuel subsidies represents a triple-win solution. It 
would enhance energy security, reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and bring immediate economic gains.” In 
both of these descriptions, budgetary savings and positive foreign exchange effects are included in economic gains. 
Thus, referring to subsidies, IEA, OECD, and World Bank (2010), p. 3, says, “they are creating market distortions, 
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C. Caveats 
 There are three important caveats – two specific and one general – to the case for 
eliminating all fossil fuel subsidies – and perhaps a case for subsidizing consumption of fossil 
fuels other than coal under certain circumstances. First, despite the negative effects of fossil fuel 
subsidies described thus far and the undesirable distributional consequences of subsidies to be 
described in Section V, eliminating all such subsidies could have an onerous effect on the poor in 
some countries. It may thus be appropriate to retain some fuel subsidies. But subsidies should be 
much more limited in scope and  much better targeted, and thus less costly, in terms of economic 
distortions, environmental degradation, and negative impacts on public budgets, balance of 
payments, energy security, and the distribution of income. Cash payments or the expansion of 
key public services that benefit the poor disproportionately are often better options. See also 
Section VI. 
 Second, in some of the poorest countries, biomass (wood, charcoal, straw, agricultural 
residue, and dung) or coal are the primary fuels used in cooking and household heating. The IEA 
estimates that in 2010 almost 2.6 billion persons worldwide, 38% of the global population, relied 
on biomass;
24
 if users of coal are added, the figure is about 3 billion.
25
 Ninety-five percent of 
these using biomass are found in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing countries of Asia. More 
than 90% of the population of several African countries relies on biomass, and this rate is 68% 
for the continent considered as a whole, even though it is only 1% in North Africa.
26
 Section VII 
considers whether fuel subsidies should be used to induce switching from these traditional fuels 
to modern fossil fuels. 
 These two caveats lead to a third and more general truth, that there is no “one size fits 
all” when it comes to the reform of fossil fuel subsidies. The UNEP has captured both the 
general case for market allocation of resources, which implies the elimination of fuel subsidies, 
and the possibility that subsidies may be needed under some circumstances, in stating:  
 
The right policy approach for each country must take account of local market 
conditions, the structure of the energy sector, patterns of energy use, institutional 
characteristics, and changing circumstances. However, there is a broad consensus 
on the need for an approach that promotes efficient, competitive energy markets 
as the foundation upon which government policies should be superimposed. 
Getting market signals right so that prices better reflect the true costs of producing 
                                                                                                                                                             
imposing an unsupportable fiscal burden on government budgets and are weakening trade balances.” It is clear that 
there are more than three “wins.” 
24
IEA (2012a), p. 532, Table 18.1. The countries with the largest reliance on biofuels are India, with 772 million, 
China (387 million), Bangladesh (149 million), Indonesia (128 million), and Pakistan (111 million). In Bangladesh 
91%  of the population relies on biomass; that percentage is lower in the other Asian countries mentioned here. 
25
Roughly 400 million people, most of them in China, rely on coal. IEA (2012a), p. 532, note 5. 
26
IEA (2012a), p. 532, Table 18.1. For a more comprehensive survey of biomass use, see UNDP and WHO (2009) 
and Ekouevi and Tuntivate (2011), pp. 2-5. 
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and consuming energy – i.e. taking account of the environmental and social 
consequences – should be a key guiding principle in all cases.27 
 
However, there may be instances in which subsidising modern energy use might 
bring some environmental benefits. For example, encouraging the use of oil 
products can curb deforestation in developing countries as poor rural and peri-
urban households stop using firewood. This can in turn boost carbon sinks and 
potentially offset the emissions from fuel combustion. Additionally, subsidies for 
oil products and electricity in poor countries can reduce indoor pollution by 
encouraging inhabitants to switch away from traditional energies like wood, 
straw, crop residues and dung.
28
 
 
While there may be a presumption that fuel subsidies should be eliminated, this cannot be known 
without a careful analysis of the details of the subsidies provided in a particular country. Since 
lack of both time and expertise precludes such analyses, no attempt is made, with a few 
exceptions, to draw firm conclusions regarding proper policy for a particular country from the 
results presented below. 
 
III.  Methodological Issues in Estimating Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidies 
 Following a very brief and general definition of fuel subsidies, this section describes the 
price-gap methodology that is commonly used to estimate fuel subsidies and compare them 
across countries and indicates some of the problems inherent in the use of that methodology. The 
final subsection notes that estimates of the amounts and rates of subsidization can be quite 
volatile, varying with the international price of fuels. 
 
A General Definition of Fuel Subsidies 
 Before fuel subsidies can be quantified, it must be known what they are. The  OECD 
(1998) has defined a subsidy as “any measure that keeps prices for consumers below market 
levels, or for producers above market levels or that reduces costs for consumers and 
producers.”29 (Emphasis added to highlight aspects relevant to the definition of consumption 
subsidies) Although this definition is quite general, it is adequate for present purposes.
30
 The 
                                                 
27
UNEP (2008), p. 7. 
28
UNEP (2008), p. 15. It is now understood that using wood for heating and cooking does not ordinarily cause 
deforestation, since most of wood is gathered, not cut. Also, it appears that fuel subsidies may not be effective in 
inducing fuel switching. See Section VII. 
29
Similarly, the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2011, p. 509) has defined energy subsidies as “any government 
action that concerns primarily the energy sector that lowers the cost of energy production, raises the price received 
by energy producers or lowers the price paid by energy consumers.”  
30 
The US Energy Information Administration (1992, p. 2) is more expansive, describing an energy subsidy as “any 
government action designed to influence energy market outcomes, whether through financial incentives, regulation, 
research and development or public enterprises.” GSI (2010) discusses alternative ways of defining fuel subsidies. 
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price-gap methodology below, as well as the previous discussion of the disadvantages of fuel 
subsidies, is consistent with it. Subsidies for the consumption of fossil fuels occur primarily 
because governments fix prices for fuel, which is often sold by state-owned enterprises, below 
market prices. 
 
B. Two Ways to Estimate Fuel Subsidies 
 Estimates of fossil fuel consumption subsidies for a given country can be built from the 
bottom up, by detailed analysis of subsidies. While such estimates are essential in informing 
subsidy reform in a particular country, including the design of policies to mitigate economic 
dislocation felt by vulnerable populations, they are time- and data-intensive, they are not 
available for many countries, and it is difficult to compare them across countries. 
 The most common way to estimate fuel subsidies involves the price-gap methodology. 
This approach simply calculates the difference between the average end-use prices paid by 
consumers of fossil fuels and the full cost of fuel, commonly called the reference price. Although 
estimates based on this methodology are less precise than bottom-up estimates, and for that 
reason generally cannot be used as the basis for designing fuel subsidy reform, they can more 
easily be produced for many countries, utilizing a common methodology, facilitating 
comparisons across countries. Moreover, they can be produced without the cooperation of 
governments that may not want to reveal the details of their subsidy programs or provide the data 
required for the bottom-up approach. But, as explained below, implementation of the price-gap 
methodology is not as simple as the description above may suggest, and there are many problems 
with it. The International Energy Agency (IEA) emphasizes that its estimates of consumption 
subsidies should be considered a lower bound on the economic cost of fuel subsidies.
31
 
 
1.  The Price-gap Methodology 
 The reference price is derived by adding the cost of internal transportation, insurance, 
distribution, and applicable value-added tax (VAT) to the cost of fuel, exclusive of those costs, 
which here will be called the “basic cost.”32 For imports of oil products, natural gas, and coal, the 
basic cost is the landed price of fuels, adjusted for differences in quality; for exports, it is the 
export price. (The calculation is somewhat more complicated in the case of exported fuel; it may 
                                                                                                                                                             
APEC (2012), pp. 13-14, is one of many publications providing more specific descriptions and examples of policies 
that subsidize the production or consumption of energy. 
31
IEA (2011a), p. 513. 
32
This term is not commonly used; it is employed here solely for expositional convenience. Coady et al. (2010), pp 
4-6, distinguish “tax-exclusive” and “tax-inclusive” subsidies. The latter include “optimal taxes,” in addition to 
marginal supply costs. Optimal taxes, which are not included in the reference prices on which the current discussion 
is based, include charges for environmental damage, and, in accord with the Ramsey rule for optimal commodity 
taxation, may be inversely related to the price elasticity of demand, in order to minimize distortion in consumption 
choices. The inelasticity of demand for fuel, at least in the short run, as well as the existence of important external 
costs, suggests that taxes on fossil fuel should be higher than those on other products. See Coady et al. (2010), p 5. 
Tax inclusive subsidies would therefore be larger than tax-exclusive subsidies. Moreover, whereas subsidies for fuel 
consumption calculated on a tax-exclusive basis occur almost exclusively in developing countries, subsidies 
calculated on a tax-inclusive basis would also occur in developed countries and would be quite large in the United 
States and China, the largest emitters of GHGs. 
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be necessary to net out the cost of transportation to shipping terminals before adding in the cost 
of domestic transportation.) For non-traded fuel and electricity the basic cost is the long-run 
marginal cost of production.
33
 For countries that both produce and import fuel, the reference 
price is a weighted average. The reference price of electricity generated by combusting fossil 
fuel is based on the annual cost of production, which depends, inter alia, on the mix of fuels used 
in generation and the reference prices of fuels.
34
 
 It is important to emphasize that the cost of production is not relevant in calculating the 
subsidy in most fuel-exporting countries. As indicated earlier, the relevant cost is the opportunity 
cost of fuel – what it would bring in the export market. In low-cost countries this may be well 
above the cost of production, in which case basing calculations of subsidies on production costs 
would produce a substantial understatement. Confusion on this issue – and the fact that subsidies 
may be implicit – may help explain why fuel-exporting countries subsidize consumption of fossil 
fuels, often quite heavily.
35
 Whether or not such confusion exists, subsidized pricing of fuel may 
represent a way of sharing mineral wealth with the population, albeit a highly distortionary and 
undesirable way.
36
 
                                                 
33
IEA (2011a), p. 512. Gupta, Clements, Fletcher, and Inchauste (2003), pp. 385-89 and Appendix, also provide an 
excellent description of this methodology. As noted below, Koplow (2009) points out deficiencies in the 
methodology. 
34
Underpricing of fuel may not result only from setting end-use prices below reference prices. Under-collection of 
bills, which may or may not  reflect a conscious policy, and theft of energy (for example, through illegal electric 
connections and diversion of fuel from pipelines) may also contribute to the de facto underpricing of fuel. See IEA 
(2011a), p. 515. Under-collection and energy theft arguably should not be considered to be subsidies, even if they 
are reflected in price gaps, unless condoned as a matter of policy. It is unclear whether the IEA estimates of 
subsidies include the effects of under-collection and theft. 
35 
In a 2010 report to the G-20, the OPEC Secretariat stated that “for countries that are well-endowed with energy ... 
the benchmark used should concern the cost of production rather than the international market price.” See OPEC 
(2010). Because of this view, OPEC did not associate itself with estimates of subsidies based on the price-gap 
methodology in IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank (2010). The author encountered this misunderstanding in 
Venezuela in the early 1980s. He was assured that there was little or no subsidy to the consumption of petroleum 
products, because prices covered the cost of production, which was well below the export price. 
 There is a sense in which the OPEC view displays economic logic – although not for “countries that are 
well-endowed with energy” that are not members of OPEC. From the point of view of any of the 12 members of 
OPEC (Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Venezuela), the existence of production quotas means that, aside from the benefit of conserving oil reserves for 
future years (and cheating, which will not be considered further), the world price of petroleum does not really 
represent an opportunity cost. Except for the fact that reserves have future value, there would be no reason for these 
countries not to make petroleum products available to their populations at prices below world prices, as long as they 
covered costs of production. The specter of exhaustion of reserves would, of course, change the calculation. If, for 
example, a country thought it had only two year’s worth of reserves left, it would rationally assign a value to 
depletion in the current year equal to the discounted value of the price that could be realized one year hence. The 
enormous reserves that some OPEC members hold makes it understandable that they might not assign a high 
opportunity cost to domestic consumption.  
36 
In advanced countries sharing of resource wealth commonly takes the form of lower non-resource taxes or higher 
spending, rather than consumption subsidies. Alaska provides each resident an annual cash “dividend.” In Texas the 
permanent school fund receives royalties from minerals (especially oil and gas) produced on land that it owns. Some 
resource-rich nations have established sovereign wealth funds and some US states and Canadian provinces have 
“heritage trust funds”  IEA, OECD, and World Bank (2010), p. 44, provides a brief description of some of these. It 
notes, p. 43, “The main objectives of oil funds are to shield the domestic economy from the volatility of world 
prices, to foster investment in branches other than natural-resources exploitation, and to share income equitably 
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2. Some Difficulties of Implementing the Price-gap Methodology 
 Implementing the price-gap methodology can be challenging. Only a sampling of the 
most important challenges can be described here.
37
 First, it may not be possible to determine 
reference prices for some fuels accurately for all countries.
38
 Although global prices are readily 
available for some petroleum products, such as gasoline and diesel fuel, prices for natural gas 
and coal are not uniform and transparent. Moreover, most coal is sold under long-term contracts, 
whereas the prices that are reported are those associated with spot sales or sales under short-term 
contracts. Even in the case of oil, adjustments must be made for the type of fuel. 
 It is especially difficult to establish reference prices for energy sources that are not 
traded.  Natural gas may be “stranded” without access to world markets, due to the lack of 
pipelines and facilities for liquifying gas.
39
 In such a case, the reference price may appear to be 
quite low – essentially production cost, plus the cost of domestic transportation, distribution, 
insurance, and VAT. In fact, the reference price should depend on the (perhaps unknown) 
opportunity cost of leaving the gas in the ground for future exploitation. 
 Since electricity, the primary outlet for coal, is generally not traded internationally (at 
least among the countries that subsidize its consumption), international prices cannot be used to 
establish a basic cost. Long-run marginal cost (LRMC) is thus used as a proxy. The volatility of 
commodity prices and the dysfunction of credit markets may make estimates of LRMC 
unreliable. (Raw materials are an important element of construction costs, and financing is 
crucial for long-lived investments in generating capacity and transmission facilities.) Moreover, 
there may be substantial differences in regional costs within a country. 
 Second, world prices must be adjusted to take account of the cost of moving fuel to 
export markets or from import points to points of consumption, which depends on the type of 
fuel and the geographical characteristics of countries. Accurate information on transportation 
margins may not exist for some countries or may vary in quality. It is common to employ a 
single estimate (or a few estimates) of unit costs of transportation for each type of fuel in 
calculating reference prices, regardless of country-specific factors, such as terrain, distance 
traveled, quality of transportation infrastructure, and economies in bulk shipments.
40
  
                                                                                                                                                             
across generations.” Lack of time and expertise precludes a thorough discussion of this topic. See, however, Davis, 
Ossowski, Daniel, and Barrett (2003). 
37
On the difficulties of implementing the price-gap methodology and the implications of these difficulties, see 
Koplow (2009). 
38
See Koplow (2009), pp. 6-7. Kaplow notes that global prices for energy may be distorted by non-competitive 
elements such as OPEC and by fuel subsidies in other countries. The implication seems to be that the basic 
assumption underlying the calculation of subsidies, that reference prices represent the social cost of energy, may not 
be valid. Seen from the viewpoint of any single non-OPEC country, this point seems irrelevant. The social cost of 
energy to that country is the world price; whether or not those prices are competitively determined seems to be 
beside the point. If one were interested in estimating the magnitude of subsidies offered by a member of OPEC that 
can exert significant market power or of those offered by all OPEC countries considered together it would be 
relevant to consider non-competitive forces. See the discussion in the text at note 57. 
39
In this case there is no difference between a consumption and a production subsidy. 
40
See Koplow (2009), pp.7-8. Noting that domestic transportation and distribution costs in developing countries are, 
on average, “remarkably similar” to those in developed countries, Gupta, Clements, Fletcher, and Inchauste (2003), 
p. 387, use costs from G-7 countries. At only about 2% of total costs, differences in international transportation costs 
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 Third, there is some disagreement on the proper treatment of taxes.
41
 The World Bank 
does not include taxes in end-use prices. By comparison, the IEA includes value-added taxes in 
calculating reference prices, the argument being that they are a normal cost of doing business. 
Some other taxes are really user chargers collected to pay for amelioration or remediation of 
damages related to energy use.
42
 As such, they should also be included in costs, rather than being 
netted from the end-user price. 
 
C. The Sensitivity of Fuel Subsidies to Movements  in International Fuel Prices 
 Pricing of fossil fuels can be characterized in one of three ways: as sporadic and ad hoc 
price setting; as automatic price adjustments, perhaps based on formulas; and as liberalized 
pricing that reflects market forces. Subsidies are generally greatest under the first regime
43
 and 
essentially non-existent under the last, except when generally applicable taxes are not applied to 
fuel and/or electricity. 
 If fuel prices are held constant or modified only infrequently, higher international fuel 
prices will imply greater subsidies, and thus larger economic distortions, more serious shortages, 
increased smuggling, more negative budgetary impacts, and greater deterioration of the country’s 
foreign exchange position.
44
 Formula-based automatic price increases would mitigate this effect, 
if only with a delay. But automatic adjustments have often been suspended in the face of large 
and rapid increases in international prices, to mitigate the deleterious effect on household 
incomes. Liberalized pricing helps assure that subsidies do not occur and that they do not grow 
when international prices rise. Even in that case, fuel prices may be frozen or fuel taxes may be 
lowered temporarily to prevent the full pass-through of increases in international fuel prices.
45
 
Subsidy reform may thus be a casualty of increases in international fuel prices.
46
 
                                                                                                                                                             
could not matter much. These authors note, however (p. 387), that shipping costs may be higher than assumed in the 
former Soviet Union, because of ice-blocked ports and pipeline constraints. 
41
See Koplow (2009), p. 8. 
42
Consistent with the discussion of note 32 above, it can be argued that the external cost of CO2 emissions should be 
included in the calculation of costs used to measure subsidies. On the other hand, it can be asserted that costs 
external to the country are not relevant in calculating subsidies; see note 13 above. Generally, no adjustment is made 
for external costs. 
43Baig, Mati, Coady, and Ntamatungiro (2007), p. 9, note “... in several cases, ad hoc adjustments translated into 
prolonged price freezes ...” 
44
Effects on emissions of CO2 are hard to tease out. In theory, greater subsidies induce more emissions. But this 
effect is properly measured relative to a level of emissions that would be lower in the no-subsidy counterfactual, due 
to the higher international price of fuel. 
45 
UN-Energy (2005), p. 15 gives such a policy qualified support:  
 
In countries that impose high taxes on imported petroleum fuels, lowering these taxes when oil 
prices are high and volatile is a way to protect the poor. Helping and protecting poor households 
requires governments to balance short term support in terms of subsidies with the longer term need 
to let market forces influence the choice of fuels and energy practices. ... 
46
Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010), p. 16, note that both Ghana and Indonesia abandoned efforts to 
reform fuel subsidies in response to increases in fuel prices and (in Appendix table 5) cite evidence that the pass-
though of international fuel price increases deteriorated when fuel prices rose between 2004 and mid 2008. See also 
Baig, Mati, Coady, and Ntamatungiro (2007), pp. 8-9, and IEA (2012a), pp. 71-72. 
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  Subsidies to the consumption of fossil fuel were 35% greater in 2010 than in 2009 ($409 
billion vs. $300 billion) and 28% higher than that in 2011 ($523 billion). Increases in subsidies 
did not necessarily reflect a decision to increase subsidy rates. Indeed, many countries were 
reducing or phasing out subsidies. Rather, it commonly reflected the fact that subsidized prices 
did not rise in step with the international price of fuels.
47
 Table 1 shows that the percentage 
changes in subsidies and in international oil prices in each year from 2007 to 2011. Except for 
the relatively small change in subsidies from 2010 to 2011, the percentage changes in subsidies 
exceeded the percentage changes in oil prices,.as might be expected a priori.
48
  
                                                 
47“The increase in the cost of fossil-fuel subsidies between 2010 and 2011 primarily reflects higher international 
energy prices and rising consumption of subsidised fuels. The estimated subsidy bill would have been even higher 
had it not been for policy interventions to reform subsidy programmes in a number of countries ... “ IEA (2012a), 
pp. 69-70. Citing IEA (2010), APEC (2012), p. 15, notes, “The considerable variations of figures between years are 
mainly due to fluctuations in world prices, ...  but also the result of changes in domestic pricing policies, variations 
in exchange rates with the U.S. dollar and shifts in demand.” For an analysis of how subsidies and taxes on 
petroleum in various types of countries changed as oil prices changed between 20003 and 2008, see Coady et al. 
(2010), pp. 6-10. 
48
A simple example is instructive. Assume that in year 1 the international price of oil is 100 and the domestic price 
of fuel is 60, so the subsidy is 40 or 40%. Assume now that the price of oil rises by 40% or 40, but the domestic 
price of fuel is unchanged at 60, so the subsidy increases to 80, or by 100%. The ratio of the percentage increase in 
the subsidy to the percentage increase in the price of oil is 100%/40%  = 2.5. 
 The above example assumes implicitly that the quantify of fuel consumed is the same in both years. If 
120%  as much fuel is consumed in the second year as in the first, increasing from a normalized value of 1.0 to 1.2, 
the subsidy in the second year 2 is 96, or 120% more than in the first year, and the ratio of percentage increases is 
120%/40% = 3.0. If, on the other hand, consumption falls by 20%, the ratio would be 2.0. 
 More generally, let O be the international price of oil in the first year and let F be the domestic price of fuel 
in the first year. If consumption is constant at a normalized value of 1.0,  both the subsidy per unit of consumption 
and the amount of the subsidy are (O – F) and the subsidy rate is (O – F)/O. If the price of oil increases by I,  the 
price of oil in the second year is O + I and the fractional change in the price of oil is I/O. If the domestic price of fuel 
is unchanged at F, the per unit subsidy in the second year becomes O + I – F and the fractional increase in the 
subsidy is I/(O – F). The ratio of the fractional change in subsidies to the fractional change in the price of oil is thus 
[I/(O – F)]/[I/O] = O/(O – F) which is the inverse of the subsidy rate in the first year. It is, of course, possible to 
allow for changes in consumption. 
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Table 1: Estimated subsidies  to the consumption of fossil fuel, 2007-2011 ($ billions); percentage changes in 
subsidies, compared to  percentage changes in oil import prices 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  
2011 
Oil  186 285 122 193 285 
Gas  74 135   85   91 104 
Coal 0    4    5    3 3 
Electricity 81 130  88 122 131 
Total 342 554 300 409 523 
% change from prior year n.a. +62.0 -55.8 +35.3 +27.9 
IEA average price of oil imports ($/barrel) 69.33 97.19 60.4 78.13 107.61 
% change from prior year n.a. +40.2 -37.9 +29.4  +37.7 
% change in subsidies as fraction of % 
change in price of oil imports 
n.a. 154.2 147.2 120.0 74.0 
 
Sources: IEA (2011) p. 508 ; IEA (2012a), pp. 69-70; “Crude oil import prices and index,” available online at: 
http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=eneprice-data-en&doi=eneprice-data-en. Pre-2011 figures do 
not reflect revisions. 
 
 A survey of 51 developing and emerging market countries reveals that pass-through of 
increases in international prices for gasoline during the 2003-06 period was far higher in oil-
importing countries (an average of 109%) than in oil-exporting countries (an average of 46%). 
This is perhaps to be expected, since the latter group of countries may feel less pressure to pass 
price increases through to consumers, since the budgetary impact of higher fuel prices is positive. 
But the oil-exporting countries in the sample were not the fabulously rich countries of the Middle 
East, which were not included in the sample. (Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Russia were 
included; Venezuela was not.) The countries with the lowest pass-through ratios were Lebanon, 
Bangladesh, Argentina, Egypt and Azerbaijan. In these countries prices increased very little or 
actually declined from 2003 to 2006, even though international fuel prices rose.
49
 Pass-through 
ratios were smaller for kerosene and diesel fuel – an average of 83%, compared to 96% for 
gasoline. This “probably reflects their relative importance in the consumption basket of poor 
households and a desire to limit increases in transport and industrial costs.”50 
 
 The sensitivity of fuel subsidies to movements in international fuel prices implies that the 
information on fuel subsidies in 2011 presented in the next section should be seen as indicating 
only orders of magnitude, based on a snapshot for that year. For earlier or later years in which 
fuel prices are higher or lower, subsidies – as a fraction of reference prices, in dollar terms, as a 
                                                 
49
Baig, Mati, Coady, and Ntamatungiro (2007), pp. 4-5. The survey was conducted among IMF economists working 
in 51 countries, but results are not reported for all these countries for all  types of fuel. 
50
Baig, Mati, Coady, and Ntamatungiro (2007), pp. 5-6. 
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percent of GDP, and relative to budget revenues, expenditures, and deficits – may be higher or 
lower. Of course, the last-mentioned percentages are also sensitive to the magnitudes of these 
budgetary figures, which are affected by macroeconomic conditions, as well as policy decisions..  
 
IV. Quantification of Fuel Subsidies and Their Effects 
 This section presents IEA global estimates of subsidies for the consumption of fossil 
fuels in 2011, estimates of some of the most important effects of eliminating subsidies, and 
reports country-specific estimates of subsidies for the 37 countries for which the IEA has 
complete data.
51
 See Table 2. While some of these are fabulously oil-rich countries, which 
together provide the lion’s share of fuel subsidies, others, including some that export oil, are 
poor. In Table 3 these subsidy data are combined with fiscal data from the IMF to calculate the 
budgetary impacts of subsidies offered by the 37 countries. 
 
  
                                                 
51
There are probably many more countries that subsidize the consumption of fossil fuel, for example, in sub-Saharan 
Africa. del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010) list 15 countries that subsidize fuel consumption that are not 
included in Table 2. Of these, 9 are in Sub-Saharan Africa, 3 are in South America, 1 is in Asia, and 2 are in the 
Middle East. Since most of these countries are very poor, their fuel subsidies are not likely to be large in monetary 
terms, either in the aggregate or on a per-person basis. Nor are global environmental effects likely to be significant. 
(In at least some countries, they are likely swamped by those resulting from inefficient combustion of biomass.) But 
subsidy rates, local economic effects, and perhaps subsidies as a percentage of both GDP and budget variables may 
be fairly large. 
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Table 2: Level and composition of subsidies to the consumption of fossil fuel; subsidy rates, 2011 
Country Dollar amount of subsidies ($ billion) Average 
subsidy rate 
 (%) 
 
(f) 
Subsidies 
per person 
($/person) 
(g) 
Subsidies as a 
share of GDP 
(%) 
 
(h) 
Oil 
 (a) 
Gas 
(b) 
Coal 
(c) 
Electricity 
(d) 
Total 
(e) 
Iran 41.39 23.4 0 17.4 82.19 70.0 1102.2  17.0 
Saudi Arabia* 46.12 0 0 14.82 60.94 79.5 2291.2 10.6 
Russia* 0 21.87 0 18.28 40.15 18.4 283.4 2.2 
India 30.86 3.03 0 5.81 39.70 18.6 33.4 2.4 
China 18.45 0 1.39  11.21 31.05 4 23.1 0.4 
Venezuela* 21.97 1.89 0 3.22 27.08 80.5 920.0 8.6 
Egypt* 15.27 3.78 0 5.42 24.47 54.2 296.5 10.4 
Iraq* 20.35 0.29 0 1.59 22.23 64.3 772.5 19.3 
UAE* 3.93 11.52 0 6.37 21.82 69.1 4172. 6.1 
Indonesia* 15.72 0 00 5.56 21.28 23.2 90.7 2.5 
Mexico* 15.9 0 0 0 15.90 16.6 144.4 1.4 
Algeria* 11.26 0 0 2.13 13.39 60.7 372.2 7.0 
Uzbekistan 1.06 9.09 0 2.59 12.74 60 448.5 28.1 
Kuwait* 4.34 2.08 0 4.68 11.10 87.8 3729.3 6.3 
Pakistan 2.79 5.54 0 2.75 11.08 35.4 83.0 5.3 
Thailand 3.29 0.48 0.85 5.67 10.29 20 150.0 3.0 
Argentina
*
 1.7 3.76 0 4.57 10.03 25.4 246.1 2.2 
Ukraine 0 6.68 0 2.66 9.34 25.5 205.4 5.7 
Malaysia
*
 5.35 0.89 0 0.94 7.18 18.4 253.4 2.6 
Qatar
*
 2.03 1.86 0 2.09 5.98 78.6 3622.0 3.4 
Kazakhstan
*
 3.19 0.33 0.58 1.75 5.85 32.6 359.3 3.3 
Turkmenistan 0.83 4.36 0 0.65 5.84 81 1115.4 22.7 
Bangladesh 0.87 1.89 0 3.00 5.76 44 34.7 5.1 
Ecuador
*
 5.44 0 0 0.12 5.56 53.7 378.6 8.4 
Nigeria
*
 3.62 0 0 0.73 4.35 33.2 26.7 1.8 
Vietnam
*
 1.02 0.16 0.02 2.92 4.12 15.5 46.7 3.4 
Libya
*
 2.26 0.21 0 0.66 3.13 76.9 487.3 8.5 
Azerbaijan 0.65 0.83 0 0.47 1.95 35.8 215.9 3.1 
Taiwan 0.45 0 0.15 1.02 1.62 3.9 70.3 0.3 
Philippines 1.46 0 0 0 1.46  4.3 15.3 0.7 
South Africa 0 0 0 1.38 1.38 4.6 27.6 0.3 
Angola 1.06 0 0 0.28 1.34 26.8 68.7 1.3 
Sri Lanka 0.82 0 0 0.28 1.10 24.1 52.9 1.9 
Colombia
*
 0.65 0 0 0 0.65 4.8 13.9 0.2 
El Salvador 0.26 0.35 0 0 0.60 29.7 97.1 2.7 
Brunei 0.31 0 0 0.16 0.47 36.5 1158.60 3.0 
Korea  0 0 0.19 0 0.19 0.3 3.8 0.0 
 
Fossil-fuel consumption subsidies designated as “electricity” represent subsidies that result from the under-pricing of only electricity generated 
by fossil fuels, i.e. factoring out the component of electricity price subsidies attributable to nuclear and renewable energy. 
*Net oil exporter 
Source: IEA (2012b).
18 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
Table 3: Subsidies, revenues, expenditures, and budget deficits as a percent of GDP; subsidies as a percent of revenues, expenditures, and budget deficits, 2011 
Country Subsidies as a 
share of GDP 
(%) 
(a)  
Revenues as a 
share of GDP 
 (%) 
(b) 
Expenditures as a 
share of GDP 
(%) 
(c) 
Budget surplus 
as a share of 
GDP 
(%) 
(d) 
Subsidies as a 
share of revenues 
 (%)  
(e) 
Subsidies as a share 
of expenditures 
(%) 
(f) 
Subsidies as a share 
of budget surplus 
 (%) 
(g) 
Iran 17.0 24.8 25.0 -0.2 68.5 68.1 -10000 
Saudi Arabia* 10.6 53.3 39.3 14.0 19.9 27.0 76.0 
Russia* 2.2 38.4 36.8 1.6 5.7 6.0 141.0 
India 2.4 18.5 27.5 -9.0 13.0 8.7 -26.7 
China 0.4 22.7 23.9 -1.2 1.8 1.7 -32.45 
Venezuela* 8.6 35.2 40.7 -5.4 24.4 21.1 -159.3 
Egypt* 10.4 22.0 32.0 -9.9 47.3 32.5 -105.1 
Iraq* 19.3 78.1 70.5 7.6 24.7 27.4 253.9 
UAE* 6.1 35.0 23.9 11.2 17.4 25.5 54.7 
Indonesia* 2.5 17.8 18.6 -0.8 14.0 13.5 -328.9 
Mexico* 1.4 22.1 25.5 -3.4 6.3 5.5 -41.3 
Algeria* 7.0 39.6 39.8 -0.2 17.7 17.6 -3684.2 
Uzbekistan 28.1 40.2 31.2 9.0 69.9 90.1 312.2 
Kuwait* 6.3 67.6 38.5 29.1 9.3 16.4 21.6 
Pakistan 5.3 12.8 19.2 -6.4 41.4 27.6 -83.3 
Thailand 3.0 22.7 24.2 -1.6 13.2 12.4 -187.5 
Argentina
*
 2.2 37.3 40.3 -3.0 5.9 5.5 -72.4 
Ukraine 5.7 42.4 45.1 -2.7 13.4 12.6 -211.1 
Malaysia
*
 2.6 21.9 28.8 -6.9 11.9 9.0 -37.8 
Qatar
*
 3.4 38.6 26.5 12.1 8.8 12.8 28.2 
Kazakhstan
*
 3.3 27.8 21.9 5.9 11.9 15.1 55.9 
Turkmenistan 22.7 18.9 15.2 5.6 120.1 149.3 405.4 
Bangladesh 5.1 11.9 16.0 -4.1 42.9 31.8 -124.4 
Ecuador
*
 8.4 40.9 41.9 -1.1 20.6 20.0 -800.0 
Nigeria
*
 1.8 29.5 29.2 0.2 6.1 6.2 900.0 
Vietnam
*
 3.4 27.7 30.9 -3.2 12.3 11.0 -106.3 
Libya
*
 8.5 38.5 63.0 -24.5 22.1 13.5 -34.7 
Azerbaijan 3.1 45.5 34.2 11.3 6.8 9.1 27.4 
Taiwan 0.3 18.8 22.5 -3.6 1.6 1.3 -8.3 
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Table 3: Subsidies, revenues, expenditures, and budget deficits as a percent of GDP; subsidies as a percent of revenues, expenditures, 
and budget deficits, 2011 (cont.) 
Country Subsidies as 
a share of 
GDP 
(%) 
(a)  
Revenues as 
a share of 
GDP 
 (%) 
(b) 
Expenditures as 
a share of GDP 
(%) 
(c) 
Budget 
surplus as a 
share of GDP 
(%) 
(d) 
Subsidies as a 
share of 
revenues 
 (%)  
(e) 
Subsidies as a 
share of 
expenditures 
(%) 
(f) 
Subsidies as a 
share of budget 
surplus 
 (%) 
(g) 
Philippines 0,7 17.3 18.1 -0.8 4/0 3.9 -87.5 
South Africa 0.3 27.5 32.1 -4.6 1.1 0.9 -6.6 
Angola 1.3 48.8 38.5 10.2 2.7 3.4 12.7 
Sri Lanka 1.9 14.5 21.4 -6.9 13.1 8.9 -27.5 
Colombia
*
 0.2 26.9 28.7 -1.8 0.7 0.7 -11.1 
El Salvador  2.7       
Brunei 3.0 62.2 32.0 30.2 4.8 9.4 9.9 
Korea  23.4 21.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
*Net oil exporter 
Source: Column (a): IEA (2012b); government spending (inclusive of grants), revenues, and deficits as a percentage of GDP: IMF (2012). Figures for Angola, Argentina, Colombia, Iran, Iraq, Korea, 
Kuwait, and Venezuela are IMF staff estimates. 
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A. The Magnitude of Fuel Consumption Subsidies 
 The IEA estimates that subsidies to the consumption of fossil fuels in those 37 countries 
amounted to $523 billion in 2011, nearly 25% more than the figure for 2010. Subsidies to the 
consumption of oil products ($285 billion) represented 54% of the total. Electricity generated by 
burning fossil fuels ($131 billion) accounted for just over 25% of the total and natural gas ($104 
billion) for 20%. Coal, with less than 1 percent of the total ($3.2 billion), may appear to be strangely 
absent, but its primary contribution is included in the figure for electricity, as is the contribution of oil 
and gas for that purpose. (The estimates reported here do not identify the composition of fuel inputs for 
subsidized generation of electricity.) China, Thailand, and Kazakhstan are the only countries in which 
subsidies to coal consumption, per se, amounted to as much as $500 million.
52
 The weighted average 
fuel subsidy rate was 24%.
53
 
 
B. The Global Benefits of Removing Fuel Subsidies  
 The IEA has produced illustrative estimates of the energy savings, reductions in CO2 emissions, 
and increases in global GDP  that would result from phasing out fossil fuel subsidies between 2012 and 
2020. Because subsidy rates fluctuate from year-to-year, the initial subsidy rate employed in making 
these estimates is the average for the three year period, 2008-2010. The baseline assumes that subsidy 
rates remain unchanged at that level.
54
 
 Not all the benefits of eliminating subsidies reported here are likely to be realized, because it is 
unlikely that all subsidies will be eliminated. Indeed, leaving political opposition aside, it may be 
appropriate, for reasons discussed in the next two sections, to retain some subsides either for 
distributional reasons or to encourage fuel switching. On the other hand, because, subsidies are likely to 
be greater than reported above, the benefits of eliminating them would also be greater. Since 
consumption subsidies are heavily concentrated in oil-rich countries, especially in the Middle East, 
results are heavily dependent on whether and to what extent subsidy reforms occur in those countries. 
 The cost of fuel subsidies is projected to reach $660 (in 2010 dollars) or 0.7% of global GDP by 
2020, if no further reductions occur. Some of these costs would be explicit, exerting pressure on 
budgets, and some implicit, initially affecting the financial condition of state oil companies. A review 
of 6 studies revealed an increase in global GDP resulting from the elimination of fuel subsidies ranging 
from 0.1% in total by 2010 to 0.7% per year to 2050.
55
  
 The IEA estimates that if fossil fuel subsidies were eliminated, global energy demand would be 
lower by 3.9% in 2020 and by 4.8% in 2035. Energy savings increase over time because consumption 
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UNDP and WHO (2009). Coal is used for cooking and heating by as much as 4% of the population in only a few 
countries: Chad (4.9%; rural: 1.1%), China (28.9%; rural: 29.8%; urban 27.7%), Guinea (19.2%; rural: 3.1%; urban: 
59.6%), Laos (21.2; rural:10.8%; urban: 44%), Mongolia (19.4%; rural:3.8; urban: 31.3%), Mozambique (12.6%; 
rural:0.9%; urban: 40.8%), Paraguay (13.8%; rural: 7.9%; urban: 17.5%), and Vietnam (5.2%; rural: 4.5%). The rural figure 
is also high in Brazil (5.4%). The figure for coal use in rural Mongolia is so low because an astonishing 49.5% of the 
population relies on dung. 
53
IEA (2012b), pp. 69-70.. 
54
Except as noted, this discussion is based on that in IEA (2011a), p. 520-22, which is more extensive than that in IEA 
(2012a).. Attempts are made to model a shift to a more energy-efficient world in IEA (2012a).   
55
Ellis (2010). The studies cited employ the price-gap methodology.  See also OECD (2009), pp. 101-109.  
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becomes more price-elastic with the passage of time. Percentage reductions vary from country to 
country, depending on the country-specific price elasticity of demand and the country’s subsidy rate.56 
 The IEA does not attempt to translate these estimates into excess burdens avoided. Four 
economists at the IMF have estimated for 1999 the deadweight loss resulting from fuel consumption 
subsidies offered by oil-producing countries.
57
 These estimates alternatively ignore environmental 
externalities or assume that they amount to $0.10 per liter of fuel. They also take account of the 
possibility that some of the largest oil exporters exert monopoly power over petroleum prices or that 
OPEC does so. The authors find that, except in the case of monopoly power by OPEC, the optimal 
price would entail a tax in all countries, instead of a subsidy, and that the implied tax rate is 
substantially higher if account is taken of environmental externalities than if they are ignored. Only if 
OPEC exerts monopoly power and environmental externalities are ignored is a member of OPEC 
justified in subsidizing fuel consumption. The argument is that, from a point of view of members of 
OPEC (and contrary to the view underlying the price-gap methodology), domestic prices should not be 
as high as export prices that reflect market power. Even in that case the implied subsidy rate is only 
one-half the actual rate.  
 Emissions of CO2 would fall with the consumption of energy. The IEA estimates that CO2 
emissions would fall by 4.7% in 2020 and by 5.8% in 2035. Environmental benefits that were not 
modeled include reductions in sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxides, and particulates. 
 
C. Country-Specific Estimates of Subsidies 
 The 37 countries for which the IEA provides data on fuel consumption subsidies are all either 
developing countries, countries in transition, middle-income countries, or – by far the most important – 
petroleum-producing countries.
58
 (Of course, some countries fit in more than one of these categories.) 
The dollar magnitude of Iran’s subsidies ($82 billion) was by far the largest, despite reforms introduced 
in 2010,
59
 followed by those of Saudi Arabia ($61 billion) and Russia ($40 billion). Together these 
three oil-producing countries accounted for roughly 35% of global subsidies to consumption of fossil 
fuel. India and China, each with more than $30 billion in subsidies, together accounted for roughly 
another 10% of the total. Pakistan ($ 11 billion) and Bangladesh ($ 6 billion) are other particularly poor 
countries lacking significant oil production that are found high on the list of countries subsidizing fuel 
consumption, ordered by the monetary magnitude of subsidies. Incredibly, Pakistan is in 15
th
 place, just 
behind Kuwait, and Bangladesh is in 23
rd
 place, two slots ahead of Nigeria. 
 Dollar amounts are not the most relevant way to characterize fuel subsidies for many purposes. 
As noted, the weighted average subsidy rate across all 40 countries was 24%. Average subsidy rates 
were at least 75% in five net oil-exporting countries, Kuwait (87.8%), Venezuela (80.5%), Saudi 
Arabia (79.5%), Qatar (78.6%), and Libya (76.0%), and in Turkmenistan (81%, primarily for the 
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IEA (2011), p. 521. 
57
Gupta, Clements, Fletcher, and Inchauste (2003), pp. 389-96. These estimates assume an optimal uniform consumption tax 
of 10 percent and a price elasticity of demand of –0.5. 
58
Except for the data for El Salvador, which the IEA provided the author, the figures reported in this subsection are from 
IEA (2012b). To obtain data for a particular country from the map, it is necessary to click on the country. 
59
The importance of these reforms is indicated by the near constancy of the dollar amount of Iran’s subsidies, which rose by 
only $1 billion from 2010 to 2011, compared to an increase of 25% for all countries – or about one-third if Iran is excluded.. 
22 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
consumption of gas), were between 60% and 70% in three more, Iran (70%) the United Arab Emirates 
– UAE (69.1%), and Algeria (60.7%%), and exceeded 50% in three others, Uzbekistan (57.1%, also 
primarily for gas consumption), Egypt (54.2%), and Ecuador (53.7%). What is more astonishing and 
disturbing, given the relatively low rates of access to modern fuels in these two countries (9% in 
Bangladesh and 32% in Pakistan), the subsidy rate was 44 % in Bangladesh (where 52% of subsidies 
went to electricity and 33% went to natural gas) and 35.4% in Pakistan (50% to natural gas and 25% 
each to oil and electricity). 
 Per capita subsidies to the consumption of fossil fuels – a measure that illustrates clearly just 
how wasteful subsidies are – exceeded $2,000 per year in 4 countries, all of them oil-rich Middle 
Eastern countries (UAE: $4,172; Kuwait: $3,729; Qatar: $2,622; and Saudi Arabia: $2,291). Per capita 
subsidies also exceeded $750 in Turkmenistan ($1,115), Brunei (1,159), Iran ($1,102), Venezuela 
($920), and Iraq ($773). 
 The economic cost of subsidies is perhaps easiest to understand if expressed as a percentage of 
GDP.
60
 In this regard, Uzbekistan is the clear winner – or loser – with 28.1%. Turkmenistan (22.7%), 
Iraq (19.3%), Iran (17%), are the only other countries in which subsidies exceed 15% of GDP. This 
figure exceeds 10% in Saudi Arabia (10.6%), and Egypt (10.4%), and 5% in Venezuela (8.6%), Libya 
(8.5%), Ecuador (8.4%), Algeria (7%), Kuwait (6.3%), the UAE (6.1%), Ukraine (5.7%), Pakistan 
(5.3%) and Bangladesh (5.1%). Although Egypt and Ecuador both export oil, they like Ukraine, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh do not belong on a list dominated by oil-rich countries. In particular, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan can ill afford to devote this much of their GDP on fuel subsidies, even if per 
capita subsidies are small in dollar terms ($35 in Bangladesh and $83 in Pakistan). The level of 
subsidies in Bangladesh is particularly worrisome, since only 9% of the population have access to 
modern fuels.
61
 Although providing large dollar amounts of subsidies, India (2.4%) and China (0.4%) 
devote relatively small amounts of GDP to fuel subsidies. 
 
D. Budgetary Impacts of Fuel Subsidies 
 Table 3 compares fossil fuel subsidies to government spending, revenue, and budget deficits for 
2011.
62
 Subsidies as a share of budgetary spending were extremely high in 3 countries whose 
governments might be described as benighted: 149.3% in Turkmenistan, 90.1% in Uzbekistan, and 
68.1% in Iran. Other countries where this ratio exceeded 20% were Bangladesh (31.8%), Egypt 
(32.6%), Saudi Arabia (27.0%), Iraq (27.4%), UAE (25.6%), Pakistan (27.6%), Venezuela (21.1%), 
and Ecuador (20.0%),. While the shares were more modest in other countries, they exceeded 10% of 
expenditures in nine of them. Subsidies exceeded 2/3 of budget revenues in Turkmenistan (120.1%), 
Uzbekistan (69.9%), and Iran (68.1%) and exceeded 40% of revenues in Egypt (47.3%), Bangladesh 
(42.9%), and Pakistan (41.1%). 
                                                 
60
This is, however, not necessarily the best way to express economic costs. Deadweight loss is proportionate to the square of 
the subsidy rate. 
61
UNDP and WHO (2009), p. 71. GSI (2012), p. 22, notes that Bangladesh has agreed to liberalize fuel prices, with 
automatic formula-based adjustments of fuel prices, as part of an agreement with the IMF. 
62
Data on government revenues, spending, and deficits as a percentage of GDP are from IMF (2012). Figures for Angola, 
Argentina, Colombia, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Kuwait, and Venezuela are IMF staff estimates. The table reports surpluses, rather 
than deficits, which appear in the table as negative numbers. 
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 A comparison of subsidies and budget deficits makes sense only if the latter are large enough to 
matter. Subsidies were greater than budget deficits that exceeded 4% of GDP in Ukraine (12.6% vs. 
5.7%), Venezuela (8.6% vs. 5.5%), Bangladesh (5.1% vs. 4.1%), and Egypt (10.4% vs. 9.9%). Other 
countries combining subsidies of at least 2% of GDP and budget deficits of at least 4% of GDP were 
Pakistan (5.3% vs. 6.4%) Malaysia (2.6 vs. 6.9%), and Lybia (8.5% vs. 24.5%). These figures suggest 
that deficits in these countries could be reduced substantially, if not eliminated, by reforming fuel 
subsidies, even if some of the savings from subsidy reform were devoted to income maintenance for the 
poor. Where deficit finance is not a problem, reduction of fuel subsidies could provide badly needed 
public funds. 
 The names of certain countries that are not major oil-exporters (e.g., Bangladesh, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Pakistan, and Ukraine) appear repeatedly in the above description of the magnitude of subsidies. 
It is reasonable to ask whether the populations of some of the countries with high ratios of subsidies to 
spending and revenues, if fully aware of the cost of subsidies, the distribution of benefits, and 
alternatives, might not prefer spending on social services, rather than fuel subsidies.
63
 Information on 
the distribution of benefits of fuel subsidies across income classes and on alternative ways of providing 
income support, described in the next two sections, suggests that the provision of subsidies for the 
consumption of fossil fuels is misguided. Clearly, it is  not the best way to deal with poverty, if that is 
the objective. 
 It must be emphasized that the calculations presented in the previous paragraphs are intended 
only to illustrate that fuel subsidies may represent low-hanging revenue fruit. But, as noted earlier, the 
IEA has warned that the estimates produced using the price-gap methodology should be considered a 
lower limit on the size of subsidies. Considerably more detailed analysis would be required to 
determine, for each country, the nature and size of fuel subsidies and how much of the cost of fuel 
subsidies could realistically be shifted to deficit reduction or expansion of public spending. That would, 
of course, depend on the necessity, feasibility, method, and cost of compensating low-income 
households for the loss of purchasing power represented by fuel subsidies, as well as the possibility of 
mobilizing for public purpose revenues needed to replace subsidies that are only implicit. 
 
V. The Distributional Effects of Fuel Subsidies 
 Subsidies to the consumption of fossil fuel are commonly introduced and defended ostensibly as 
a means of reducing the burden of fuel prices on the real incomes of the poor. In fact, a variety of 
studies show that fuel subsidies are quite ineffective in achieving this result. Because the studies cover 
different collections of countries, rely on different kinds of data, and employ different methodologies, it 
is difficult to integrate them.   
 Based on a survey of 11 of the countries that subsidized consumption of fossil fuels in 2010, the 
IEA estimates that only 8% of the $409 billion spent on fuel subsidies benefitted the poorest 20% of the 
population.
64
 The percentage of subsidies benefitting this group varied from only 2% in South Africa to 
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Increasing awareness of the distribution of benefits of subsidies is a standard and important component of descriptions of 
strategies for implementing subsidy reform. See the sources cited in note 9. 
64
This discussion and that of the next paragraph draws heavily on IEA (2011), pp. 518-21. A chart showing the percentage 
of benefits reaching the poorest quintile in each country appears on page 519. The countries, listed in decreasing order of the 
percentage of subsidies benefitting the poorest quintile of the population, were Pakistan, China, Vietnam, Thailand, 
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11% in Pakistan. If fuel subsidies were truly disproportionately benefitting the poor, this figure would 
exceed 20%.
65
 Often poor households lack access to subsidized natural gas and electricity and cannot 
even dream of owning a vehicle that runs on subsidized motor fuel. 
 Subsidies to kerosene consumption are the most effective in reaching the poor, despite the 
incentive to smuggle this fuel to other countries or divert it to uses not intended for subsidization. 
Nearly 15% of kerosene subsidies benefitted the lowest quintile of populations. By comparison, 
subsidies to liquified petroleum gas (LPG), diesel fuel, and gasoline were the least effective in reaching 
the poor; only 5 to 6% of their benefits went to the poorest quintile. In the case of LPG, the heavy 
initial cost of equipment and the practice of selling gas in large quantities (compared to sales of 
kerosene) creates a barrier to its use by the poorest households. With shares of 9 and 10%, respectively, 
benefitting the poorest quintile, electricity and natural gas fall in the middle of the range. These results 
demonstrate that fossil fuel subsidies are an inefficient means of helping the poor and suggest that there 
are probably more cost-effective and less distortionary ways of achieving the same distributional 
objective, namely cash grants and social welfare programs. 
 Subsidies to the consumption of fossil fuel affect real incomes primarily through two 
channels.
66
 The direct impact occurs when households pay higher prices for fuel and electricity used for 
heating, lighting, cooking, and private transportation. Its distributional effects depend on the 
distribution of subsidies across types of fuel and the importance of expenditures on each type of 
subsidized fuel purchased for these purposes at various points in the income distribution. The indirect 
impact is transmitted through higher prices paid for goods and services, including public transportation. 
Its distributional effects depends on the fuel-intensity of various products (particularly utilization of 
diesel fuel and electricity as inputs to transportation and other sectors), as well as consumption patterns 
and the distribution of subsidies among fuel types. Since estimates of distributional effects generally do 
not allow for substitution away from fuel and other products that become more expensive, they should 
be interpreted as either short-run impacts or upper limits on long-run impacts. 
 That fuel consumption subsidies are an ineffective way to benefit the poor is hardly surprising. 
In many of the poorest countries, including several that subsidize fuel consumption, a large share of the 
population does not even have access to modern fuels.
67
 Instead, they utilize wood, charcoal, straw, 
agricultural residue, dung, or coal for heating and cooking. The UNDP and WHO (2009), p. 14, lists 22 
countries in which no more than 5% of the population has access to modern fuels. The access rate is 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Indonesia, Angola, Bangladesh, India, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and South Africa. The IEA selected these 11 countries “on the 
basis of data availability for those that have low levels of modern energy access, and have an aggregate population of 3.4 
billion.” IEA (2011), p. 519. Bangladesh is the only one of these 11 countries that is among the 42 mentioned in the 
discussion that follows of results reported in UNDP and WHO (2009). 
65
The accuracy of this statement depends on how proportionality is defined. Because of inequality in the distribution of 
income, far less than 20% of the benefits of a fuel subsidy that increased all incomes proportionately would accrue to the 
poorest 20% of the population. 
66
Like most of the literature, this discussion focuses on the effects on real incomes that are transmitted through the effects 
fuel subsidies have on fuel prices. There may also be effects on employment and incomes in the fuel sector and in sectors in 
which fuel is an important input, such as transportation and agriculture. GSI (2012) emphasizes the link through agriculture 
in Bangladesh. 
67
For this purpose, access to modern fuels refers to use of these fuels for cooking, which generally implies use for heating as 
well. Access to electricity, which means an electrical connection, is included in access to modern fuels only if electricity is 
used for cooking. See UNDP and WHO (2009), p. 6. Access rates for electricity are much higher than those for modern fuel. 
They are at least 25% in all but 6 countries of the world’s poorest nations, all of which are small island nations, and they are 
at least 75% in many; UNDP and WHO ()2009, p. 12.  
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less than 10% in 29 countries and below 25% in 42. Almost all of these countries are located in Sub-
Saharan Africa or Asia. Households without access to modern fuels are almost certainly the poorest in 
each country. 
  In Bangladesh, where the subsidy rate was 44% in 2011, less than 10% of the population relies 
on modern fuel; the other 90% are thus unlikely to benefit from fuel subsidies, except indirectly. In 
Pakistan, both the subsidy rate (35%) and the percentage of the population lacking access to modern 
fuels (68%) were lower, but it is again unlikely that fuel subsidies have much impact in reducing the 
burden of acquiring fuel at the bottom of the income distribution. Even in Nigeria, an important oil 
exporter that has a subsidy rate of 33%, less than 3/4 of the population relies on modern fuel.
68
 
 The direct benefits of subsidies to fuels that are used by only a small percentage of a country’s 
population accrue primarily to the elites; they are inevitably highly regressive.
69
 It seems highly 
unlikely that the indirect effects of fuel subsidies would be weighted so heavily in favor of the poor that 
the overall effects of fuel subsidies would not be regressive. 
Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010) review studies of the distributional 
implications of subsidy reform in 20 countries, 9 from Africa, 4 from Latin America, 5 from Asia, and 
2 from the Middle East, by examining the effects of a US$0.25 per liter increase in the price of fuel in 
each of the countries. The result, on average, is a 5.9% decline in real income, with a low of 3.8% in the 
Latin American countries and a high of 9.6% in the Middle East. Significantly, more than half of the 
impact is indirect. Data for 12 of the countries (8 of them in Africa) reveal that, although transportation 
represents only 3.3% of household expenditures, it accounts for 10% of the indirect impact fuel 
subsidies have on real income, due to the high energy intensity of the sector. Food accounts for just 
under 40% and non-food for just over 50%.
70
 
 The composition of direct impacts differs quite markedly across countries. In Ghana and 
Indonesia the posited increase in the price of kerosene would cause real income to fall by 5.0% and 
4.1%, respectively. In only 3 other countries is the decline as much as 1.0%. By comparison, reflecting 
the lack of access to automobiles in the poorest countries, increasing gasoline prices reduces real 
income by more than 0.7% only in Lebanon, where the decline is 1.9%. Because many households lack 
access to certain types of fuel, figures on direct impacts may substantially understate the impact of a 
price increase on households that do have access. Thus, for example, if the access rate is only 10%, a 
0.4% overall impact on real income would translate into a 4.0% impact on households with access.
71
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Information on the percentage of populations that rely on modern fuels are from UNDP and WHO ()2009, pp. 71-77; see 
also Ekouevi and Tuntivate (2011), p. 2, which indicates that the share of the population relying on traditional fuels exceeds 
70% in five oil-exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the highest share being Chad’s 91.2%. These authors note (p. 5) 
that in 2008 the IEA estimated that, over the period 2006-30, 10 oil- and gas-exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
could provide minimal energy services, such as electricity and LPG cylinders and stoves, to households at a cost of only 
0.4% of revenues from oil and gas exports.   
69
This result is confirmed in Bangladesh, where only 8.8% of the population has access to modern fuel (UNDP and WHO, 
2009, p. 71) and the top two income classes enjoy almost 80% of the direct benefits of subsidies to natural gas and LPG and 
almost 90% of the direct benefits of subsidies to petrol and diesel; see GSI (2012), p. 16. Unfortunately, there is no 
indication of the percentage of households that have each level of income or of the percentage of income accruing to them. 
Moreover, this analysis does not include the indirect benefits of fuel subsidies. GSI (2012), p. 15. Much more of these 
would, of course, accrue to lower income groups. 
70
Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010), p. 10. 
71
Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010), pp. 8-10. 
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 Fuel subsidies were found to be neutral in their impact on the distribution of income across 
quintiles in these countries. This means that, as a way to support the income of the poor, fuel subsidies 
are badly targeted. But distributional impacts varied considerably by type of fuel. Subsidies to the 
consumption of kerosene provided relatively more benefit to the poor, as a percentage of income, while 
gasoline and electricity subsidies worsened the distribution of income. Estimates of the distribution of 
subsidy benefits tells the same story. The top quintile receives roughly 6 times as much in benefits as 
the bottom quintile (42.0% vs. 7.3%). In the case of gasoline and electricity this ratio was much higher, 
20 and 14 times as much, respectively. In the case of kerosene, each quintile received roughly 20 
percent of the benefits of subsidies.
72
 
 Electricity subsidies provide relatively more benefits, the greater is household income. This 
phenomenon may reflect lack of connections for the poor more than differences in consumption 
patterns for those that are connected. In El Salvador, for example, for those with positive consumption, 
electricity subsidies represent about the same percentage of income in all quintiles but the top one, 
where it is lower. But almost one-third of households in the bottom quintile lack connections, compared 
to an average of about 6% in the other 4 quintiles. While lifeline tariffs have the potential to minimize 
electricity costs for households that are connected to the grid, they provide no benefits to those that are 
not. Extending access to the poor may thus be one of the most effective ways to provide fuel subsidies 
to the poor.
73
 
 There is often an urban bias in the availability of subsidized fuel. Thus the UNEP (2008), p. 15, 
observes regarding LPG subsidies in India:  
 
LPG subsidies mainly benefit higher-income households. ...  An estimated 76 per cent of 
this subsidy is allocated in urban areas, which contain only one quarter of the 
population. Of this urban subsidy, over half is enjoyed by approximately one quarter of 
households. This means that almost 40 per cent of the LPG subsidy benefits a mere 7 per 
cent of the population. Moreover, the subsidy represents less than 5 per cent of 
expenditure for this segment of the population. This is a far lower share than what 
Indians living below the poverty line spend on kerosene.
74
 
 
On implication is, of course, that subsidizing use of kerosene is a far more effective anti-poverty policy 
than subsidizing use of LPG.  
 
VI. Protecting the Poor When Fuel Subsidies Are Reformed 
 In the absence of fuel subsidies, the cost of fuel consumption can impose an onerous burden on 
the poor.
75
 But, as a means of providing income support for the poor, fuel subsidies are generally 
poorly targeted and highly ineffective. They simply do not provide much “bang for the buck.” 
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Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010), pp. 10-12. The appendix to that paper contains breakdowns by regions. 
73
Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010), p. 12. 
74
Subsidies to electrification may, in principal, benefit rural households, but if they result in deficits for the state-owned 
electrical company, it may be the poor who endure power outages. 
75
On the topic of this section, see the references in IEA, OECD, and World Bank (2010), pp. 38-41. 
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According to Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010, pp. 11-12), it would cost $14 dollars in 
subsidies, on average, to transfer $1 to households in the lowest quintile of the income distribution. 
Subsidies for kerosene are better targeted, as this ratio is only about $5. But even this is an inefficient 
way to help the poor. The cost-effectiveness of kerosene subsidies is limited by the risk of smuggling 
and substitution of subsidized kerosene for unsubsidized diesel fuel. Even if fuel subsidies are 
relatively well targeted to relieve burdens on the poor, they distort resource allocation and put a strain 
on public sector budgets. Thus, as Baig, Mati, Coady, and Ntamatungiro (2007), p. 14, note, “As most 
fuel subsidies accrue to higher income households, it should be possible to eliminate or substantially 
reduce subsidies, use some of the budgetary savings to finance better targeted-programs to compensate 
the poorest households, and still have funds left over.”76 This section discusses how to protect the poor 
when fuel subsidies are reformed. 
 Subsidies to the consumption of fossil fuel do not only affect real income, through what 
economists call income effects. They also have substitution effects; by altering the relative prices of 
fuels and other goods and services, they distort consumer choices, encouraging over-consumption (and 
perhaps waste) of fuel and the emission of greenhouse gases. Moreover, unless targeted carefully, they 
also benefit the non-poor and distort their choices. This line of reasoning suggests that, subject to the 
possibility (discussed in the next section) that fuel subsidies can have a desirable substitution effect, by 
inducing switching from biomass and coal to modern  fuel, policies that have only income effects and 
that benefit primarily the poor should be utilized to protect the real income of the poor when fuel 
subsidies are reformed. 
 The case for mitigating the negative impacts of subsidy reform varies from country to country. 
It is useful to distinguish, as in the previous section, between direct and indirect effects of subsidy 
reform. Only households with access to modern fuels would suffer directly from subsidy reform, 
though many more may suffer indirectly. In the 22 countries in which no more than 5% of the 
population has access to modern fuels (or the 29 in which less than 10% of the population has access to 
modern fuel), the case for offsetting the direct impact of subsidy reform would seem weak, as few of 
those who would be harmed directly by subsidy reform are likely to be the poorest members of 
society.
77
 In such countries it is probably more sensible to concentrate on trying to offset the indirect 
effects of reform, which would not be so heavily concentrated at the top of the income distribution. The 
case for compensation for direct impacts of reform would be stronger in countries where large fractions 
of the population rely on subsidized fuel. Even in those cases, it may be difficult to compensate the 
poor for the direct impact of subsidy reform. 
 The feasibility of mitigating negative impacts that subsidy reform would have on the poor also 
varies from country to country. The choice of techniques to be used to mitigate burdens on the poor as 
fuel subsidies are phased out will depend in part on the institutions and administrative capacity of the 
country and its government. Where social safety nets exist, they can be expanded or improved, by using 
information on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics to target relief to particularly vulnerable 
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Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010), p. 13. 
77
Readily available data do not reveal whether these countries subsidize consumption of fossil fuel, except in the case of 
Bangladesh, where the average subsidy rate is 44% and subsidies amount to 5.1% of GDP, although only 9% of the 
population have access to modern fuel. In five of the countries examined in Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010 
), which are presumed to subsidize fossil fuel consumption, less than 5% of the population has access to modern fuel, and in 
three more countries (including Bangladesh), less than 10% do. 
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parts of the population (e.g., the elderly, children, the unemployed, and those living in areas of high 
poverty).
78
 It may be possible to exploit local knowledge (for example, that of teachers or community 
leaders) to target cash payments.
79
 Better targeting makes it possible to achieve the same or better 
distributional results, while avoiding distortions and spending less.
80
 But any such techniques are 
vulnerable to abuse or outright corruption.   
 Where social safety nets do not exist or are inadequate, it may be necessary to use  more indirect 
ways of helping the poor, such as subsidized school meals, reduced fees for education and health care, 
subsidies to urban mass transport, life-line tariffs, and, where feasible, cash transfers to vulnerable 
groups. Public spending that is especially beneficial to the poor can also be expanded, such as health 
and education expenditures, expansion of rural roads, and electrification.
81
  
 Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010), p, 15, describe the experience of five 
countries (Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique, Indonesia, and Jordan) in reforming fuel subsidies. Among the 
actions taken to relieve the burden on the poor in one or more of these countries were the following: 
cash payments to the poor, assistance to single mothers, increased funding of microcredit programs 
targeting disadvantaged rural women, lifeline tariffs for water and electricity, waiver of school fees, 
free textbooks, investment in rural health services, electrification, and drinking water supply, increased 
access to LPG, and an increase in the minimum wage. 
 There is a strong case for eliminating most subsidies to consumption of fossil fuels. There 
would be allocational, environmental, budgetary, and foreign exchange benefits. But there may a case 
in some countries for temporarily retaining well-targeted fuel subsidies (e.g., temporarily retaining 
subsidies to kerosene, while phasing out other fuel subsidies), recognizing the limitations of such a 
policy (budgetary cost, limited distributional impact, economic distortions, the risk of smuggling and 
diversion to replace diesel fuel) – and the risk that subsidies retained “temporarily” will become 
permanent. Among the reasons are the difficulty of quickly implementing well-designed alternatives 
(cash grants and spending programs), the advantages of reducing reliance on biomass and coal, and the 
benefits of electrification. As UNEP says: 
 
In practice, there may be a good case for retaining an element of subsidy to improve 
access to modern energy sources for the poor – especially where social welfare 
infrastructure for distributing income support to the poor does not exist. This argument 
is particularly strong for electricity because of its key role in economic and social 
development, in alleviating poverty and reducing indoor pollution. Therefore, subsidies 
                                                 
78 
It may make sense to means-test cash transfers, but being overly ambitious would, in effect, introduce many of the 
complications that plague ill-advised attempts to implement universal income taxation in developing countries. It would 
require an attempt to determine the income of households that are generally exempt from income tax, for administrative 
reasons, as well as on equity grounds. For a useful discussion of targeting income maintenance programs, including a 
“Checklist of Economic Considerations in Price-Subsidy Reform,” albeit not in the context of reform of fuel subsidies, see 
Gupta et al. (2000). There is also a useful discussion of political considerations in the design of subsidy reform. 
79
For a review of experience with social safety nets in Indonesia, Mexico, and Brazil, see IEA, OECD, and World Bank 
(2010), pp. 40-42. 
80
IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank (2010), p. 38, notes that “some of the better known and effective programs spend 
around 0.5% of GDP.” This compares favorably with the figures for subsidies as a percentage of GDP for most countries 
reported in Table 2, 
81
Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010), p. 13. 
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are likely to remain a major part of pro-poor energy policies in developing countries for 
some time. The challenge is to make sure that they do not lead to excessive levels of 
energy consumption and environmental damage. UNEP (2008), p. 21   
 
That there may be a case for well-targeted fuel subsidies in some cases does not mean that most 
subsidies should not be eliminated. All to often, and for too long, fuel subsidies have been promoted, 
enacted, and retained on the grounds that they are needed to protect the poor from high energy prices, 
when in fact they benefit primarily the non-poor.  
 
VII. Incentives to Switch from Traditional Fuels 
 As noted in the Introduction, the use of traditional fuels (biomass and coal) for cooking and 
heating is associated with serious problems – problems not associated with the use of modern fuels 
(kerosene, gas and electricity) – and is unsustainable in many countries. Cooking and heating with 
biomass or coal in poorly ventilated quarters causes respiratory diseases (mainly pneumonia, chronic 
respirator disease, and, in the case of coal, lung cancer), especially among women and young children, 
and carries a risk of burns and uncontrolled fires. The need to gather wood and carry it home, which 
may consume several hours per day in some cases, takes women and children from more productive 
activities, participation in the remunerated economic activities in the former case and education in the 
latter.
82
 The use of cow dung for fuel reduces the organic content of soil and thus soil fertility, and 
deforestation leads to soil erosion and eliminates an important carbon sink.
83
 Many of those who use 
traditional fuels do not have access to improved cook stoves, some of which reduce the need for fuel 
used in cooking by as much as 30 percent. In 26 countries, almost all of them in Sub-Saharan Africa, no 
more than 10% of those using solid fuel have access to stoves that embody improved technology.
84
 
 There is also a distributional element to this problem, as access to modern fuels is least common 
in the least developed countries, is less prevalent in rural areas than in urban areas, and is especially 
uncommon among the poorest members of society. Indeed, since income is generally higher in urban 
than in rural areas and access to modern fuels is substantially lower in rural areas, fuel subsidies are 
almost inevitably regressive, even leaving aside the distribution of subsidy benefits among those who 
do utilize the subsidized fuels. 
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For a useful survey of issues related to the combustion of biomass and coal, see von Schirnding et al. (2002); see also 
Ekouevi and Tuntivate (2011), pp. 5-9 .  
83
von Schirnding et al (2002), p. 22,  note, however, that deforestation and erosion resulting from the burning of wood may 
be overstated, because most wood used for cooking and household heating is collected, rather than cut. Moreover, Ekouevi 
and Tuntivate (2011), p. 9, note, “It is now widely accepted that the clearing of land for arable and pastoral agriculture is the 
main cause of deforestation rather than the use of wood for energy, as was believed in the past.” The last authors note (p. ix) 
that there are, however, exceptions, such as areas surrounding growing urban areas in some Sub-Saharan African countries 
and Haiti. 
84
WHO and UNDP (2009), p. 21. In Bangladesh, one of the two Asian countries on this list, only 2% of those using 
traditional fuels have access to improved cooking stoves. 
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 It may appear that there is a case for subsidizing the consumption of fossil fuels other than coal, 
in order to induce fuel switching.
85
 Thus the UNEP says, “Where they result in switching from 
traditional fuels and in improved access to electricity, those subsidies can bring considerable benefits to 
poor communities. These include less indoor pollution and a reduction in the time women and children 
spend gathering fuel and, therefore, more time for productive activities like farming, and education.”86 
A case study for Uganda that focuses on these issues advocates government intervention to encourage 
transition to modern fuels.
87
 
 According to this reasoning, it may not always be enough to provide cash grants to the poor or 
provide public services of special significance to the them when fuel subsidies are eliminated. 
Elimination of fuel subsidies does create a level playing field between traditional and modern fuels. 
But, compared to the distorted situation with fuel subsidies, such a neutral policy means that there is a 
substitution effect that encourages the use of biomass or coal instead of fossil fuels.
88
 Thus, a “Citizen’s 
Guide to Energy Subsidies in  Bangladesh” warns, “Fuel subsidy reform could lead to an increase in 
biomass consumption. This should be an important consideration for government when designing 
reform policies and accompanying support measures for low-income groups.”89 This reasoning 
suggests that in extremely poor countries there may be a case for retaining (or providing) well-targeted 
subsidies to the use of fossil fuels other than coal.
90
 
 On the other hand, there is evidence that fossil fuel subsidies are not effective in inducing the 
poor to shift from biomass to modern fuels, except perhaps in urban areas, where access to, and use of, 
                                                 
85 A given household does not only use only one type of fuel, moving up the “energy ladder” as its income improves or it is 
induced to switch fuels because of shifts in relative prices. Heltberg (2004), p. 870-71, observes: 
 
The ‘energy ladder model’ underlies much of research, analysis, and policy formulation in the area of 
household energy. The energy ladder model conceptualizes fuel switching in three distinct phases. The 
first phase is characterized by universal reliance on biomass. In the second phase of fuel switching 
households are hypothesized to move to ‘‘transition’’ fuels such as kerosene, coal, and charcoal in 
response to higher incomes, urbanization, and biomass scarcity. The third and final phase of fuel 
switching is characterized by households switching to LPG, natural gas, or electricity for cooking. 
Growing incomes in conjunction with relative fuel prices are seen as determining factors for the speed 
with which households fuel switch by moving up the energy ladder. The major empirical achievement of 
the energy ladder model is the ability to capture the strong income dependence of fuel choices. ...  
 
Yet the ladder image is perhaps unfortunate because it appears to imply that a move up to a new fuel is 
simultaneously a move away from fuels used hitherto. ... In fact, uptake of a new cooking fuel far from 
always displaces traditional fuels. Many households in developing countries routinely use multiple 
cooking fuels. 
86
 UNEP (2008), p. 14. 
87
Mwaura, Okoboi, and Ahaibwe (no date). 
88The IEA (2011), p. 497, observes, “While advanced cookstoves can help cut wood fuel use substantially, the economic 
arguments alone may not be compelling for many households, especially if wood fuel is considered “free” and the time of 
the persons collecting it – typically women and girls – is not sufficiently valued.” The health benefits of fuel switching, 
which accrue mainly to women and children, may not be recognized or valued highly. 
89GSI (2012), p. 19. Citizen’s Guides have also been prepared for India, Indonesia, and Nigeria. 
90
Access to fuel (e.g., connections to the electrical grid and the ready availability of LPG in containers small enough that the 
poor can afford them) may be as important as price in determining switching to modern fuel. Thus policy should sometimes 
be targeted to providing more widespread access. Also important is the availability of micro-credit that allows poor 
households to make the capital investments needed to use clean fuel. 
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modern fuels is much more common and access to biomass is not as easy.
91
 Heltberg (2004, p. 885) 
states: 
 
There are not many policy options for promotion of fuel switching. Price subsidies for 
modern fuels have historically been used in the name of promoting fuel switching—but 
price subsidies are often undesirable because of their high fiscal costs, poor targeting 
(especially in the case of LPG), and leakage (in the case of kerosene). Kerosene 
subsidies would in many cases have the most pro-poor distribution, but kerosene sold for 
fuel is inevitably re-directed to automotive uses on a large scale. ... Subsidized kerosene 
is therefore little effective as a tool for fuel switching, despite the fact that among all the 
modern cooking fuels kerosene probably competes the closest with firewood. 
 
The UNEP document quoted above goes on to say: 
 
In reality, however, these subsidies often benefit mainly the energy companies, 
equipment suppliers and the better-off households, especially in the towns and cities. In 
some cases, they may not even reach the poor at all. As a result, many energy-subsidy 
programmes intended to boost poor households’ purchasing power or rural 
communities’ access to modern energy through lower prices can, paradoxically, leave 
the poor worse off, since the costs are shared by the entire population including the 
poor.
92
 
 
 The choice of fuel to use for cooking and heating appears to be highly dependent on income 
level and education, the latter perhaps because of the higher implied opportunity cost of using solid 
fuel.
93
 About 3 billion people currently rely on traditional fuels and, since income and educational 
achievement are unlikely to be increased rapidly, an estimated 2.8 billion will do so in 2030.
94
 Thus, 
“clean energy” efforts have been directed not so much at fuel switching as at improved use of 
traditional fuels – assuring adequate supplies of fuelwood, improved ventilation, and uptake of clean 
stoves, which can decrease emissions of GHGs and particulates, health risks, and the amount of time 
spent in gathering fuel.
95
 Some energy-efficient stoves are more affordable than switching to stoves that 
burn kerosene or LPG. Even so, subsidies for clean stoves have been disappointing, leading to poor 
maintenance and abandonment of malfunctioning stoves, as well as high budgetary costs.
96
 
Microfinance may facilitate the purchase of an improved stove by the poor.
97
 In some contexts there 
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Heltbert (2004). See also Ekouevi and Tuntivate (2011), pp. 18-19, which emphasizes the role of consumer preferences. 
92
 UNEP (2008), p. 14. 
93
Heltberg (2004, p. 885). See also the references in Ekouevi and Tuntivate (2011), p. 8.  
94
IEA (2012a), p. 532. These figures include those cooking with coal. 
95  
See Heltberg (2004), p. 886. Ekouevi and Tuntivate (2011), pp. 10-21, reviews the results of World Bank projects focused 
on household energy access. 
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Ekouevi and Tuntivate (2011), p. 26.  
97
Ekouevi and Tuntivate (2011), p. 27.  
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may be a case for subsidizing the development, manufacture, and distribution of improved stoves, 
rather than subsidizing either the consumption of fossil duels or the purchase of energy-efficient 
stoves.
98
 
  
VIII. Subsidies for Electrification 
 The IEA (2011) p. 472, estimates that 1.3 billion people worldwide, or 19% of the global 
population, do not have access to electricity.
99
 Of these, more than 95 % live in either Sub-Saharan 
Africa or the developing countries of Asia, and more than 80% live in rural areas. Ten countries, four in 
Asia and six in Africa, together account for almost two-thirds of those without electricity. While 
Bangladesh is the only one of these four Asian countries with an electrification rate less than 50%, in 
five of these six African countries, from 77 % to 92% of the population lacks access to electricity. 
Whereas the electrification rate is 92% in urban areas of developing countries, in rural areas it is only 
64%. UNEP (2008), p. 27, states the case for subsidizing electrification, especially in rural areas, and 
perhaps the on-going use of electricity by the poor:
100
 
 
Access to electricity services is essential to alleviate dire poverty and improve living 
standards. Certain energy services can only be provided effectively by electricity. It is 
the only practical means of running basic domestic appliances, such as telephones and 
refrigerators. And it provides the best quality and cheapest form or lighting. ...  Good 
lighting allows people to extend the day, which, in turn, enables them to read or study 
longer, raising educational levels. Access to electricity also boosts economic 
productivity, by reducing manual labour. It also leads to better health, by replacing 
polluting indoor fuels, by improving hygiene with the use of refrigerators and by making 
it possible to provide modern health services. Electricity, for example, enables doctors 
and clinics to keep vaccines and medicines refrigerated, so that routine and emergency 
treatment can be offered locally.
101
 
 
 This is a tough nut to crack. If the objective is universal access to electricity, it may be 
necessary to subsidize electrification, including costs of connecting to the grid, because the poor may 
lack the ability to pay these costs, either up-front or spread out and included in monthly charges. 
Improved access to credit could help, if the problem is lack of access, but not if it is low income.
102
 In 
any event, it is probably appropriate to subsidize both connection and the use of electricity in schools 
that serve primarily the poor, because of the public benefits of education. 
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UN-Energy (2005), p. 12. 
99
The data reported here are from IEA (2012a), p. 532-33. For further information on electrification rates in the least 
developed countries, see WHO and UNDP (2009), pp. 10-12. 
100
See also UNEP (2008), pp. 27-29. 
101In addition, “In general, subsidies for liquid fuels are particularly difficult to target, given the ease with which such fuels 
can be sold on the black market. In comparison, the distribution of electricity and piped natural gas is more easily monitored 
and controlled.” IEA, OECD, and World Bank (2010), p. 13. 
102The “Citizens’ Guide to Energy Subsidies in Bangladesh” notes, “[A]chieving this goal [extending electrification to all 
villages by 2020] depends on tackling rural poverty more effectively, as poor households have little incentive to access 
electricity when suffering from severe deprivations.” (GSI (2012), p. 19  
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 In theory, limiting subsidies for the use of electricity to the poor is most effectively achieved 
through the use of life-line tariffs – setting a low price for the first tranche of use. By making these low 
rates available only to those with consumption below a very low level, defined in term of capacity or 
average consumption, it is possible to avoid applying the low rate to use by other consumers.
103
 But 
experience has been mixed, in part because of poor design. Until recently, eligibility for the lifeline rate 
was so generous in Tanzania that many well-off households qualified.
104
 More generally, Komives et 
al. (2007) find that quantity-based subsidies generally do not perform well in targeting benefits to the 
poor. They observe (p. 673), “the poor targeting performance of quantity-based subsidies is the 
combined effect of a coverage gap between the poor and non-poor, the poor performance of quantity 
consumed as a proxy for income, and the presence of general subsidies and fixed charges. ...” They 
conclude that geographic targeting is often more effective in limiting benefits to the poor. Data on 
socioeconomic circumstances of areas can be used to determine where subsidies to electrification are 
appropriate.
105
 
  If tariffs are limited to what consumers can pay, investments in electrification may not be 
financially viable; subsidies are likely to be required.  The result may be, in addition to economic 
distortions and  unsustainable budgetary impacts, the inability to serve those who would benefit most 
from electrification. In India, for example, subsidies were so generous (about 50% of costs for 
households and 90% for farmers) that electricity boards incurred such large losses that they could not 
meet targets for connecting new villages and rural households.
106
 
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks: Reaching Multiple Goals with Subsidy Reform 
 The previous discussion suggests the following criteria for judging the efficacy of policies 
related to subsidy reform: environmental effects (reduced emissions of GHGs, gaseous pollutants, 
including carcinogens, and particulates); economic effects (reductions in economic distortions, foreign 
exchange shortages, difficulties of demand management, and energy insecurity); effect on the public 
budgetary situation; protection of the real incomes of the poor who use fossil fuels directly (including 
access to public services); and improvement of the situation of the poor who do not now use fossil fuels 
directly (increased income, including access to public services; improved access to affordable clean 
fuel and modern stoves). Table 4 is an attempt to indicate the effectiveness of various combinations of 
policies, as measured against these criteria. A politically important column is omitted from the table: 
the effects on the real incomes of the non-poor; in all cases these effects are likely to be negative.. 
These groups are, of course, likely to try to undermine attempts at subsidy reform. 
 Option 1, subsidy reform, which might involve partial or complete elimination of subsidies to 
the consumption of fossil fuels, with nothing more, would provide environmental, economic, and 
budgetary benefits, but would reduce the real incomes of both the poor who use fossil fuel directly and, 
                                                 
103In theory there would be a “notch” – a discontinuous jump in payment – at the point at which eligibility for the life-line 
tariff ceases. This is unlikely to be a serious problem if the threshold is set low enough. 
104
UNEP (2008), p. 23.  
105
For a review of experience in this area, see IEA, OECD, and World Bank (2010), pp. 37-40 
106
UNEP (2008), p. 29. By comparison, see the description of favorable experience of Chile in subsidizing rural 
electrification, p. 28. 
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through indirect effects on prices, the real incomes of the poor who do not now use fossil fuel directly. 
It is unlikely to be politically viable. 
 Options 2 and 3, which combine subsidy reform with either income support or increased public 
services, would mitigate, and perhaps outweigh, the negative effects on the real incomes of those who 
consume fossil fuel directly, and might also improve the situation of the poor who do not now consume 
fossil fuel directly. These distributional effects would, of course, depend on the coverage of income 
support (especially whether it reached those who do not now consume fossil fuel) and the nature of the 
increased public services. 
 Option 4 combines subsidy reform with an effective program to provide clean energy (improved 
stoves or better ventilation and greater access to biomass) to those who do not now consume fossil fuel, 
as well as either income support or increased public services. It would provide even greater 
environmental benefits than the other options, by resulting in less particulate pollution (and, if coal 
would otherwise be burned inefficiently, fewer carcinogens), and greater economic benefits, by freeing 
women and children to pursue education and more productive work than gathering firewood. Whether 
the budgetary situation would improved is unclear.     
 In short, in many of the countries that subsidize  the consumption of fossil fuels it should be 
possible to kill several birds with one stone – or a few stones. Reforming fuel subsidies would improve 
resource allocation and have environmental benefits. Details of what is possible beyond that are 
country specific, but it probably would be possible to use either cash payments or increased public 
services to protect the real income of the poor. Since the distribution of benefits of subsidies is 
commonly regressive, in many countries this could probably be achieved while generating budgetary 
savings. A clean energy program would benefit those not consuming fossil fuels directly. 
Table 4: How to Kill More Than on Bird 
Instrument   Objectives 
 Subsidy 
reform, with: 
Environmental 
benefits 
Economic 
benefits 
Improved 
budgetary 
situation 
Protecting the real 
income of the 
poor using fossil 
fuel directly 
Improvement of the 
situation of the 
poor not using 
fossil fuel directly 
 1. Nothing 
more 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
 2. Income 
support 
Yes Yes Probably, but 
less 
Yes Depends on scope 
of support program 
 3. Increased 
public services  
Yes Yes Probably, but 
less 
Yes Depends on nature 
of services 
4. Option 2 or 
3, with clean 
energy 
program 
Yes, greater Yes, 
greater 
Unclear Yes; as in options 
2 and 3 
Yes 
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